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The successive developments in monetary and fiscal policy, as
Williams has pointed out, have been toward gaining progressively
more initiative in influencing the volume of aggregate spending
and national income.t
Discount policy seemed insufficient because a low discount rate,
for example, encouraged but did not guarantee an easier reserve
position through rediscounting, and therefore an expansion of
bank credit, and therefore an upward response by business ac-
tivity.
Attention gradually shifted to open market operations. With
this activity the monetary authority did not have to await the
initiative of the commercial banks in the creation of reserves.
Through an affirmative use of open market purchases or sales, the
Federal Reserve had acquired the initiative in the creation of re-
serves. But this did not prove to be the perfect answer. Particu-
larly was this true when the problem was to encourage a recovery
from low levels of business activity. Excess reserves could be
created, but what if people did not want to borrow?
In the thirties our attention turned to the deliberate use of the
governmental-receipts spending process as a way of influencing the
level of national income. This was basically a logical extension of
the evolution of monetary policy. If the private sector of the
economy could not be counted on to borrow and thus activate the
business situation, we would rely on governmental deficits to pre-
cipitate the borrowing and spending. This constituted one fur-
ther step, it was hoped, toward tightening the relation between
policies pursued and results desired - a rise in the volume of
spending and national income. So complete was this shift of em-
phasis, however, that we no longer considered ourselves operating
within the ambit of monetary policy. These new policies incident
to the governmental-receipts spending process were fiscal policies.
1 John H. Williams, "Deficit Spending," American Economic Review, Proceed-
ings; reprinted in his Postwar Monetary Plans and Other Essays (New
York: Knopf, 1947), chap. 9.
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I
Unaccustomed to performing in the role of minister without
portfolio, monetary policy looked around for something else to do
and found it. This was the maintenance of more orderly condi-
tions in the capital markets. Something which we have heard a
great deal about in the war and postwar period, its origin is back
at least as far as 1937. In that year, and again in 1939, the Fed-
eral Reserve stepped in with open market purchases, not because
of pressure on reserves, but "to contribute to the maintenance of
an orderly bond market ..."2
The further development of this facet of monetary policy during
the war is a familiar story, and I shall not belabor it here. The
rate structure from 3Js per cent on Treasury bills to 21/2 per cent
on long-term issues was held until 1945, at which time the shift to
the longer-term issues forced the Federal Reserve to buy short-
terms, which created bank reserves, which abetted the inflation we
were attempting to restrain.
With the rising volume of bank loans in 1946 the shift out of
governments (short and long) became even more inflationary as
the resulting creation of reserves resulted in a creation of new
money destined for rather immediate expenditure.
In 1947, non-bank holders also began a substantial unloading of
government securities as more attractive alternative earning op-
portunities developed.
Periodic increases in the short-term rates and an expert use of
Treasury surpluses did exert some moderate restraint on the bank
credit inflation, but the modest approach (as it was called) inevi-
tably produced comparatively modest results, because financial in-
stitutions could always bail themselves out of pressure through
sales of government securities at supported prices.
II
Why was the Federal Reserve so reluctant to modify in a more
substantial way its support policy during the postwar boom? If it
was inflationary during an inflation, why was it not changed?
A consideration of these questions takes us into the heart of the
whole concatenation of monetary problems arising out of the ex-
istence of a large public debt. There were, I think, three main
2 Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Covering Operations for the Year 1939, p, 9.
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reasons - all quite short and forthright. They were and are im-
portant because they are the background considerations which may
well be the raw material for monetary policy again in another
boom.
1. A rise in the level of rates would be objectionable because
the market value of outstanding securities would fall, the Treasury
might experience refunding difficulties, and it would have un-
favorable repercussions on financial institutions.
2. A rise (at that time even in short-term rates) would be un-
desirable "because it would increase the cost to the government of
carrying the public debt."3
3. There was "even less reason to suppose that it would be of
value in combatting inflationary dangers which have arisen from
two primary causes, neither of which would be corrected by higher
rates."4
Since these considerations are still very much a part of our cur-
rent thinking, it is essential that we examine in order some of their
implications.
1. That a rise in rates would induce a decline in the price of
outstanding securities (government as well as others) is incontest-
able. The two effects are basically different sides of the same
operation. Whether that rules out the desirability of a rate rise is
another question. There is some reason to think, for example, that
some considerable part of the unloading of longer-term govern-
ment securities in the early part of 1948 might have been discour-
aged if the support prices had been set slightly below par instead
of slightly above in late December, 1947. In that case institutions
and other potential sellers would have had to face the prospect of
converting a paper loss into an actual loss if they unloaded govern-
ment obligations in favor of higher yielding private debentures
or securities.
It is a question of judgment, of course, as to how restrictive a
slightly below par price would have been at the time the decision
was made in December, 1947. This much it seems reasonable to
say. A slightly below-par price probably could have been found
which would have imposed a penalty on sales without being so
drastic a decline below par as to raise questions about public con-
fidence in securities. And in the process, funds would not have
31945 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve System, p. 5.
'"Ibid, p, 7.
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been made quite so readily and automatically available to private
borrowers.
A par support policy cannot be justified on the grounds that the
solvency of financial institutions would thereby be impaired,
though that was a consideration occasionally expressed at the
time (and was mentioned in the 1945 report). Most institutions
would not have been required to carry their government securities
at less than par, and no question of capital loss would have been
raised unless they actually had sold the securities-which is pre-
cisely what it was desirable to discourage at any event. Further-
more, it has been shown that any temporary disadvantage of
higher rates because of lower security prices would very quickly
have been offset through higher earnings thereafter.e
It may, in fact, be questioned just where the interests of finan-
cial institutions lie in the long run - with relatively flexible rates
and security prices or with fairly rigidly supported prices and
rates. The commitment to support the price of bonds at par is no
part of the bond contract. The Treasury initially committed itself
to pay, for example, on a $1,000 bond $25 per year and $1,000 on
the due date. If now the provision is added that the holder can at
any time unload for face value, even long-term bonds become very
close to pure cash. It would not then be surprising if some ques-
tions were forthcoming about whether 2lh per cent were not a
rather heavy interest burden on an obligation with no credit risk
and apparently also no market risk.
The commitment to bail the holder out at any time is no part of
the contract, that is, at the outset. It can be argued with some
force that the longer security prices are prevented from falling be-
low par, the greater does become the moral commitment. And the
more confused the public will then get about the extent to which a
decline below par is in some sense a breach of promise on the part
of the government - a default on its full faith and credit.
2. That a rise in interest rates would increase the interest cost
of the debt to the Treasury is scarcely open to question, though the
point was probably overemphasized. The rates to be pushed up
first were the short-term obligations. And the subsequent
"modest policy" demonstrated that comparatively moderate in-
creases periodically made could keep the market enough off-bal-
ance to exert considerable effective pressure. Moreover, somewhat
Ii Paul A. Samuelson, "The Effect of Interest Rate Increases on the Banking
System," A'll'lM'ictln EtxnWmiD ReviBw, (March, 1945), pp. 16-27.
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in excess of $20 billion of government securities were held by the
Federal Reserve Banks, and any added interest cost on this part of
the debt could be, as it subsequently was, returnable to the Treas-
ury. Nevertheless, the fact still remains that with a $250 billion
debt the interest cost will eventually rise at the rate of $2.5 billion
per 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate thereon.s
Now this brings us to an important aspect of this question. In
our discussions of fiscal policy, a major limitation to an expansion
of the public debt was considered to be the interest charge relative
to national income." Our postwar experience raises the question
as to whether this is the burden. Nevertheless it is certainly an
important one, and I think we are justified in raising the question
as to whether, in view of a tax and deficit conscious Congress, the
limitation imposed by this burden is not already beginning to press
in upon us at around 2 per cent of our gross national income. It
may be that the trouble arises because Congress takes too narrow a
view of this limitation. They are not sufficiently aware that econ-
omists are prepared to be sanguine about even larger relative
transfer payments. (Economists qua economists, that is, are thus
sanguine. The views of economists qua taxpayers, one observes,
are often not so different from those of more common clay after
all.) The plain fact is that the jaundiced view which Congress
would take of a request for more money to pay higher interest
rates on the public debt does constitute a very serious problem
with a debt the present size and is already a real limitation to a
rational debt management policy during a boom. In the present
state of knowledge, the bacon Congressmen are elected to bring
home is not more taxes to pay, more interest income to those who,
it is suspected, have too much money anyhow.
This the Treasury knows. Consequently it has a perfectly under-
standable bias in favor of low interest rates, and the bias can be
expected to be a function of the relative size of the debt. One will
grow as the other grows. Each time the Treasury requires funds,
it will accordingly be inclined to a rate on the low side. Further-
more, it will be inclined to short-term securities, which now carry
a lower rate, which also means the Treasury is more continuously
in the market on refunding operations, which makes Federal Re-
serve support of the market seem even more essential to the
Treasury.
II The full effect would, of course, be felt only after sufficient time had elapsed
so that all outstanding obligations had been refunded.
7 Evsey D. Demar, "The Burden of the Debt and the National Income,"
American Economic Review, (December, 1944), p. 800.
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The Federal Reserve's dilemma is then posed. They can restrict
credit to restrain the boom, which will force rates higher, which
means the Treasury's refunding operation fails because its issues
are at unattractively low rates, which probably also means a con-
gressional investigation, etc. Or they can assure the success of the
Treasury's operations by appropriately easy money, which means
easy money for all, which is inflationary during an inflation.
3. Would a rise in interest rates have stopped the inflation?
Just how important, in other words, is monetary policy in de-
termining the level of national income. This is really the basic
question. The Federal Reserve's skepticism about the potential
effectiveness of monetary policy during the postwar period was
probably justified to a considerable extent. In that period people
were wanting goods badly, and they could pay for them. This
simply added up to a volume of effective demand out of any reason-
able relationship to our capacity to produce, and any reasonably
restrictive monetary policy probably could not have pruned it back
sufficiently.
a) In part, however, this skepticism probably reflected also the
increasing reservations developing prior to the war about the ex-
tent to which interest rates were after all a very important part of
spending and saving decisions. They did not seem, in the short
run at least, to have much effect on consumer spending out of in-
come. Nor did it seem probable that a change of a per cent or so
in interest rates would be important to a business contemplating
an investment outlay. This line of analysis has tended, I think,
to take too narrow a view of the phenomenon in question, and this
has not served us well in the postwar period.
It is essential to remember that when we used the term interest
rates, we were really using a sort of symbolic shorthand to cover
the whole phenomenon of availability of funds. But then we
tended to forget that the term interest rates was merely a SYmbol,
started analyzing the SYmbol as the substance, and came to the not
surprising conclusion that it was not a very important determinant
of the level of business activity. We thereby overlooked the fact
that the phenomenon of rising interest rates means a great deal
more than just charging the borrowing customer a half per cent
more or so on a loan. It means that loan applications get more
careful scrutiny. Some get pruned down. Others are turned down
altogether, which would earlier have been granted. Financial in-
stitutions on investment account begin to pursue a wait-and-see
30 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE
attitude, with the result that new issues become difficult to float on
favorable terms. The increasing institutionalization of personal
savings means that their availability to borrowers has become ex-
tremely sensitive to prospective changes in interest rates. Thus,
savings out of income (i.e., the position of the consumption func-
tion) may be little affected by interest rate changes, but the avail-
ability of the savings to borrowers is very much affected, prob-
ably more so than in the past.
b) A large part of our difficulties in pursuing a restrictive
monetary policy during the postwar boom stemmed from our hav-
ing forgotten, or at least unduly underestimated, the significance
of some sort of a Wicksellian concept of a normal rate of interest.
Wicksell defined the normal rate of interest, you will recall, as
simply "the rate of interest at which the demand for loan capital
and the supply of savings agree ..."8 On the one side is the de-
mand for loan capital on the part of those households and firms
with ex ante deficits. They expect to spend beyond incomes. This
total demand for loan capital represents expected deficits in the
budgets of households and firms which require financing. For
these units outlays are expected to exceed receipts by the extent of
deficits.
These deficits require financing. In equilibrium an interest rate
is arrived at which equates the extent to which the deficit spenders
spend in excess of income with the extent to which the savers
spend short of income. Total spending, and therefore the level
of national income, is just sustained. The excess spending of the
"defiicit" spenders is just offset by the "not-spending" of the
savers. The demand for loan capital and the supply of savings are
equal, with the interest rate representing the intensity of the
pressure of the one against the other. The rate of interest, to use
one of Professor Schumpeter's phrases, represents the "00-
efficient of tension" in the system - the intensity of demand for
present balances to finance deflcits.s
In the postwar inflation the magnitude of these deficits was not
subject to the constraint of the volume of "not-spending" by the
savers. Almost everybody was trying to push spending ahead of
income. This normally would have resulted in an accentuated
pressure of deficits against the limited volume of ex ante savings.
8 Knut Wicksell, Leeture« on Political EC01IOmy, Vol. II, Money (London:
Routledge, English edition, 1935), p, 193.
IlJ. A. Sehumpeter, Busines8 Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 126.
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The "coefficient of tension" would have mounted and only the more
urgent deficits would have materialized.
But deficits in the postwar period were very readily financed in
all sorts of ways. Bonds could be unloaded at attractively supported
prices. Or a moderately higher rate than on government securities
tempted prospective lenders to dump government securities and
take on non-government earning assets. The rate at which funds
could be obtained was substantially lower than the normal rate-
defined as the rate at which the demand for loan capital and the
supply of savings are equal. In Wicksellian terms the monetary
rate was below the normal rate. Ex ante deficits were in excess of
savings, and on each successive "round" aggregate spending rose.
The moral of the story is: The position of the monetary rate
relative to the normal rate is, after all, important. We may dis-
agree as to whether the monetary rate's agility is very sufficient to
keep it close to the normal rate, but we overlook at our peril the
fact that the normal rate does exist. My own view is that the mone-
tary rate, if within its ambit is included (as it should be) the whole
concept of the terms of availability of funds, is given credit for less
agility than it actually possesses.
One condition was, however, involved in this process-that the
government obligations could be unloaded. This implied that there
was something to unload them on, and that unhappy institution in
the postwar period was the Federal Reserve. The arrears of con-
sumer and business capital meant a high normal rate. An appro-
priately high monetary rate meant low bond prices. Sustained
bond prices meant a low monetary rate, spending continuously
accelerating, and more price inflation. There was the dilemma of
the postwar boom.
e) There are two implications of this which are worth mention-
ing here. A wartime rate structure should be set with particular
regard to whether it will be tenable in the postwar period. War-
time stability of rates, essential as that may be, is a secondary
issue. With the elaborate direct CG:"4--"l., and a strongly organized
central or reserve banking system, .most any reasonable rate
structure can be maintained during the war. The real question
is whether the terms of obligations issued during the war will be
reasonably articulated with the postwar economic facts of life-
to be specific, the Wicksellian normal rate. It may, in other words,
be desirable to finance the war at rates higher than necessary inci-
dent to war financing if the existence of the debt is not to serve as
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a major instrument of inflation in the postwar period. The rate
structure of World War II was on the contrary more nearly retro-
spective-geared to the depression developments of the prewar
decade. Rates were thus about two notches below an appropriate
level in the postwar period.
But the main significance of this side-trip into theory is that
interest rates on government obligations, long-term as well as
short-term, may be persistently below the normal rate. If so, very
important questions are posed. We may not know the answers
but there is little disposition to doubt that the questions exist, and
that they are very real questions. Will the demands of our economy
on consumer account, investment account, foreign account, and
government account add up to a chronic tendency for ex ante
deficits to be in excess of savings? If so, yield rates on govern-
ment obligations must rise, or the alternative will be abetting up-
ward pressure on prices. But more of this in a moment.
III
1. What we have witnessed here, of course, is the progressive
sterilization of monetary policy by fiscal and debt management
policy. That is, I think, increasingly generally recognized.tu What
may not have been so obvious is that this inability to pursue a. re-
strictive monetary policy during a boom may also be going a long
way toward neutralizing an effectively restrictive fiscal policy. The
restrictive effect of a governmental cash surplus, for example, may
largely be lost if households and firms can bail themselves out of
this limitation by borrowing or by ready sales of government se-
curities. We get, in other words, a chain reaction. Monetary
policy is immobilized because of the apparent requirements of
fiscal and debt management policy. This immobilization in turn
tends to neutralize the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
The substantial corporation income tax in and of itself, for ex-
ample, undoubtedly constituted some restriction on these firms'
postwar expansion plans. On the other hand the effect was ma-
terially blunted because corporations had recourse to a liquidation
of government securities from 1945 to 1948 of $7.2 billions plus
substantial bank borrowing to offset this constraint, and it was un-
questionably a substantial offset.n
10 For some prophetic words on this point see D. H. Robertson, Essays in
Monetalry Theory (London: Staples, 1946), p. 13I.
11 "Working Capital of U. S. Corporations," June 30, 1949, Securities and
Exchange Commission Release No. 892.
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Now this inability of monetary policy to come to grips with a
boom has been a rather bizarre finale to the story. The shift in
emphasis to fiscal policy in the prewar decade was thought to be
precisely because it was not a boom, but a depression with which
we then had to deal. Monetary policy was considered to be effec-
tive certainly and appropriate probably (there was less agreement
on that point) to check a boom. "The monetary weapons can, in-
deed, be applied effectively to check an expansion," stated Pro-
fessor Hansen, probably summarizing prevailing opinion on the
subject.1 2
What started out as a procedure to gain the initiative in a de-
pression seems to have resulted in our losing the initiative in the
boom also.
2. It may be argued that this less than delightful turn of events
policy-wise stems not from the operation of fiscal policy, but simply
from the war legacy of a huge public debt that had to be managed.
There is, of course, much force to this argument. The debt cer-
tainly grew at a rate which was never contemplated in the more
responsible deficit-spending discussions about the affirmative use of
fiscal policy to combat depressions. On the other hand the point
should not be overemphasized.
In our discussions of fiscal policy in the prewar decade we were
quite evidently prepared to think that a necessarily vigorous exer-
cise of fiscal policy might well lead to a considerably larger public
debt. With that in mind a great deal of our thinking regarding
fiscal policy had to do with precisely this question of the burden
of a domestically held debt. Particularly was this possibility of a
substantial rise in the public debt an explicit part of our thinking
in connection with the mature economy thesis. It is difficult to be-
lieve, therefore, that the war debt poses any fundamentally new
problems which we might otherwise never have had to face. There
is, on the contrary, a great deal of reason to think they would have
faced us in any event anyhow.
3. A further question may be raised as to whether a great deal
of this is not water over the dam since the announced change of
policy in June of this year. At that time, as mentioned earlier, the
Federal Reserve took advantage of the fact that market strength
had lifted bond prices off the support levels to announce that:
12 Alvin H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Ine., 1941), p. 71.
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"The Federal Open Market Committee, after consultation with
the Treasury, announced today that with a view to increasing the
supply of funds available in the market to meet the needs of com-
merce, business, and agriculture it will be the policy of the Com-
mittee to direct purchases, sales, and exchanges of Government se-
curities by the Federal Reserve Banks with primary regard. to the
general business and credit situation. The policy of maintaining
orderly conditions in the Government security market, and the
confidence of investors in Government bonds, will be continued.
Under present conditions the maintenance of a relatively fixed pat-
tern of rates has the undesirable effect of absorbing reserves from
the market at a time when the availability of credit should be in-
creaeed.J'i»
Does this not mean that monetary policy's indenture to fiscal and
debt management policy is concluded, and that monetary policy
win again pursue its more historic function of having to do with
general economic stability? Perhaps. It is to be hoped that this
constitutes a substantial step in that direction. There is, however,
reason for being less than certain about how fundamental the
change really may turn out to be.
The "policy of maintaining orderly conditions in the Govern-
ment security market" and encouraging "confidence of investors in
Government bonds," which is to be continued, was the point
d'appui for the monetary problems which bedeviled us during the
postwar boom. The question still remains, therefore, as to how
differently we might wind up again if we were to experience an-
other substantial boom, since we would be starting from about the
same point.
The real question is whether the June announcement constituted
a recognition of changed conditions or whether it represented a
fundamental change of policy. The final sentence of the release
indicates that the former was presumably a substantial considera-
tion. With the inventory recession, private demand for credit be-
gan to weaken. Funds seeking investment were turning more
toward government securities, and the resulting market strength
carried their prices off the pegs. The pegs consequently could
rather readily be removed without our having to face the implica-
tions of a freer market for government securities with higher
rates. In fact, prior to June this year the Federal Reserve, in
aa "Press Release of June 28, 1949," Federal Reserve Bulletin, (July, 1949),
p. 776 (italics mine).
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endeavoring to support the stipulated price levels, found them-
selves selling securities in response to market demand - a policy
which had the effect of holding interest rates up during a re-
cession.
The real test of the extent to which there has been a substantive
change of policy will come with the next business upsurge. Pri-
vate demand for credit will then be strong, and funds will start
shifting out of governments and into higher yielding non-govern-
ment earning assets. Prices of government securities can then be
expected to sag, and the conflict between debt management policy
and "primary regard to the general business and credit situation"
will then be posed in a way which it is not posed in a recession.
Will "orderly conditions" be interpreted then as preventing only a
cumulative speculative collapse of government security prices, al-
though allowing them to fall to some sort of equilibrium level, even
if that should be below par? The answer is by no means a self-
evident yes.
In his remarkably candid December 1, 1949, letter to Senator
Douglas, Mr. Eccles suggests that he, at least, also does not feel
that the Federal Reserve is as yet in a position to pursue a
sufficiently restrictive money policy in the event of inflationary
pressures. In his letter, written early this month, he cogently
argues:
"Under these conditions it can hardly be said that the Federal
Reserve System retains any effective influence in its own right
over the supply of money in the country or over the availability
and cost of credit, although these are the major duties for which
the System has statutory responsibility. Nor can it be said that
the discount rate and open market oper.ations of the System are
determined by Federal Reserve authorities, except in form. They
are predetermined by debt-management decisions made by the
Treasury. This will be true as long as the System is not in a posi-
tion to pursue an independent policy, but must support in the
market any program of financing adopted by the Treasury even
though the program may be inconsistent with the monetary and
credit policies the System considers appropriate in the public in-
terest."14
Ii Statement of Man-iner S. Eccles befor« the Subcommittee on Monetary,
C'f'edit, and Fiscal Policies of the Joint Committee on the Economic RepOTt,
NO'IJemb8'f' 22, 1949, and Supplementary Letter to Senator Douglas of De-
cembe'f' 1, 1949 (Washington: Federal Reserve Board of Governors), p. 7.
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4. This emergent dominance of debt management policy is some-
times described as a Treasury-Federal Reserve or Federal Reserve-
Lending Agencies conflict. There is no question but that these seem
to be the principals. It seems to me, however, that to characterize
it in this manner is to describe the symptom rather than the sub-
stance. The problem is more basic. It represents a lack of articu-
lation in our total economic and social policy measures and ob-
jectives. By and large we liked almost everything about a period
of rising prices, except rising prices. The feeling of excess de-
mand for practically everything was particularly comfortable in
view of our legacy of depression-mindedness.
The postwar boom illustrates this well. Were some people's
housing needs not being met? Was it because people could not
pay the prices? Very simple. Let them borrow more - 100 per
cent, if necessary. Did that make the monthly terms too high?
Equally simple. Extend the period; lower the rates. And it was
done.
Were taxes a constraint on spending? Then Congress must
lower them. And it did.
Was the burden of paying interest on the debt apt to be onerous?
The solution? Well, the interest on a debt twice as big is the same
if interest rates are half as high. Let the Treasury keep that in
mind. And it did.
Is a bond more valuable at par than below par? Then let the
Federal Reserve know "it is expected to keep them at par. And
it did.
This could be expected to add up to an economic situation that
did not particularly please anyone. And it did.
In short, until we have made more clear, and perhaps seen more
clearly ourselves, cause-and-effect interrelationships, the ramifica-
tions of some of these policies, we can certainly expect a continua-
tion of the demand to have our cake and eat it too.
We shall again in a boom insist on low prices and then keep
them higher through low interest rates. We shall continue to de-
mand lower construction costs and then force them up with more
generous mortgages. And the apparent altercations between the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury or the Federal Reserve and the
various other lending agencies win be little more than a reflection
of our own inability to arrive at a seasoned, mature, responsible,
and reasonably consistent economic policy.
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Something might, I think, be accomplished by the formation of
a National Monetary Council, as recommended by the Hoover Com-
mission, composed of representatives of the Federal Reserve, the
Treasury, and other regulatory and lending agencies. In this way
a formal, organized procedure for airing all points of view (par-
ticularly the Federal Reserve's) would be provided, and the prob-
ability of agencies being oblivious to contradictory policies might
be minimized. This would he all to the good, and might result in
some greater consistency of policy.15
We should not, however, expect too much from it. If these intra-
agency conflicts are largely reflections of internal contradictions
within our total social and economic policy, they will not be liqui-
dated by appointing the contending principals to the same com-
mittee.
In the final analysis our success in dealing with this problem is
going to depend largely on how clearly Congress and public opin-
ion see the implications of available alternatives. So far 88 debt
management and monetary policy are concerned, there are three.
a) We can continue as at present with the Treasury largely the
architect of monetary policy through decisions on the terms and
rates of public debt issues, and with the Federal Reserve taking
the necessary action to implement these decisions. This means the
continuation of low interest rates, not only for the public debt, but
generally. More importantly, it means only a negligible monetary
defense against upward price pressures, through the maintenance
of a monetary rate below the normal rate.
b) If we insist that something be done monetary-wise in case
of inflationary developments, but are unwilling to permit higher
rates or adequate flexibility in government security prices (which
may- mean below-par prices) we must then be prepared to accept
a possibly increasingly complex method of forcing holders of bonds
to hold their bonds.re The special reserve proposal outlined by the
Federal Reserve in 1947 points one way-the proposal that banks
be forced to hold a designated proportion of their assets in certain
government securities. It will not be enough, however, to apply it
merely to banks. Other holders must be included also. It is well
not to forget for example, that holdings of government securities
by insurance companies declined $3.8 billions during 1947 and
1948. Theoretically all holders, i'fI.Cluding inditvid'UJlls, should under
15 G. L. Bach, "The Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy Formation," Ameri-
can Economic Review, (December, 1949), p. 1189.
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these circumstances be required to hold obligations up to some
designated amount.
The issue here is simple. If the terms of the government obliga-
tions are not sufficiently attractive to induce their being held
voluntarily, people must be required to hold them involuntarily.
c) We can reactivate the Federal Reserve mandate to determine
monetary and credit policy with respect to the general economic
situation. This means, among other things, we must be prepared
to see some more flexibility in bond prices, in order that the rela-
tionship between the monetary rate (availability of funds) and
the normal rate will be more consistent with broad economic
policies.
The most difficult question, of course, is whether the degree of
flexibility required to exercise monetary restraint (particularly if
below-par prices were required) would precipitate an unaccept-
ably disorganized market. It may be that more of the public debt
will need to be refunded into non-marketable securities with
redemption before maturity subject to a penalty discount, or per-
haps eonsols the Federal Reserve will explicitly make no attempt
to support.
The degree of flexibility contemplated even so would not pre-
sumably be very vast. The institutionalization of savings, together
with the size of the public debt "have made the money market
much more sensitive to relatively modest action than was formerly
the case."17 This does not, in short, mean the Federal Reserve
should during inflation kick the props out and "let 'er rip." It is
to be hoped that discouraging disorderly and disorganized develop-
ments in the bond market does not need to mean fairly rigid
support-that there is no compromise between a chaotic and a
frozen market. It must, however, be admitted that in the practical
operation of monetary policy this distinction is both extremely
necessary and extremely difficult to make.
This does not mean that monetary policy is expected by itself
to solve the riddle of economic stability. It does mean that it be
free to operate in the right direction, rather than in the direction
of being unable to restrain the boom and at the same time neutral-
16 Woodlief Thomas and Ralph A. Young, Problems of Postwar Monetatry
Policy, "Postwar Economic Studies," (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, November, 1947); "Proposal for Special Reserve Require-
ment against the Demand and Time Deposits of Banks," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, (January, 1948), pp. 14-23.
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izing a restrictive fiscal policy, as is quite possible under present
conditions.
The third alternative does mean, in short, responsibly engineer-
ing that degree of flexibility in yield rates which will in fact dem-
onstrate that the public debt is not a slightly sophisticated green-
baekism, and will encourage holders of government obligations
to understand that their bonds are not to be considered as pract-
ically cash.
IV
If we can regain somewhat more initiative with respect to mone-
tary policy, we shall not then need to rely quite so exclusively on
fiscal policy. This is all to the good-not because fiscal policy is
bad, but because it is always better to work from more than one
angle if possible. Moreover, it may be essential to gain somewhat
more initiative with monetary policy if fiscal policy, particularly
in a boom, is not also to be neutralized.
By fiscal policy I mean simply the impact on the volume of eco-
nomic activity of the governmental receipts-spending process.
There would be general agreement, I think, that this impact is apt
to be quite substantial for some time to come. To this even those
who are made somewhat uncomfortable by the prospect would
probably agree. It seems to follow that if the effect is going to
be quite substantial in any case, it should, where possible, work
in the right direction.
As the economists, meeting under the auspices of the National
Planning Association, have very cogently pointed out: "If we do
not adopt such a policy deliberately we are likely to be forced
into an imperfect version of it through the pressure of events."18
This means that when private demand and spending is weak, the
governmental receipts-spending process should help things out.
This it can do either by dipping less taxes out of the income stream,
and thus encouraging private spending, or by stepping up its own
spending, and thus supplementing private demand (spending).
During a boom, the process should work the other way around.
The affirmative theory of the thing has been worked out in con-
siderable detail, and is almost a part of the lore of economic policy.
17 Allan Sproul, "Monetary Management and Credit Control," Monthly Re-
view, Supplement, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January, 1947'),
p, 6.
18 Hearing before the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, September
23, 1949, p. 7.
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I do not propose to try to add anything here along that line. I do
not believe our difficulties in the more expert operation of com-
pensatory fiscal policy arise out of any serious lack in the develop-
ment of the theoretical principles. On the other hand, even those
who have been very sympathetic with what it might contribute
to economic stability, of which I am one, have become increasingly
disturbed by certain other questions. My own view is that satis-
factory answers to these questions must be found before we can
proceed much farther in the use of compensatory fiscal policy. It
may be useful to pose a few of them here.
1. Can we find ways to minimize some very real limitations to
a variable spending policy?
a) Just as emphasis early was primarily, though by no means
entirely, on public spending, so also some of our early uneasiness
has had to do with how readily in practice the volume of public
spending could be altered in a contracyclical manner. So far as
public works spending is concerned, the construction industry has
long been recognized as too narrow a funnel to pour in an amount
of spending which might be necessary in a substantial general
business decline. What might rather be aimed at would be a suf-
ficiently contracyclical pattern of public works spending to encour-
age greater stability in the construction industry. Since it has
traditionally been one of the more volatile sectors of the economy,
this would be no mean contribution to stability generally.
b) One of the more serious questions about a compensatory
spending program is how to make sure it increases employment
and production rather than prices and costs. We found early in
the defense and war program that a cost-price inflation began to
develop long before we had reached a reasonable maximum of
production and employment. To be specific, the wholesale price
index during 1941 advanced 13 percentage points (16 per cent)
even though unemployment averaged 5.6 million during the year.
Our experience was somewhat similar during the 1936-37 boomlet,
though the picture was complicated by the wage increases incident
to labor's organizing some of the basic industries.
Perhaps some part of the trouble then was that we had operated
too long at low-production levels. Inadequate capacity in some
industries bottlenecked the general expansion and forced prices
up before full production could be achieved. If so, the problem
should be less serious in the period ahead since the various seg-
ments of the economy are better geared to high-production levels.
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My own view is, however, that this will be more than offset by
the greater power of organized labor to force up wage rates in
excess of rising rates of productivity-thus leaving the problem
of a cost-price inflation still very much with us.
c) But the most difficult problem incident to a contracyclical
spending program has to do with the hard question of timing. It
has generally been argued that these measures should be launched
fairly shortly after the beginning of the decline. This seems to be
a very reasonable proposition, but it is exceedingly difficult to
put into practice. It is simply not easy to know very promptly
just where we are in the cycle. A review of some of our past dis-
cretionary policy actions, most of which have to do with other
things than the timing of expenditures, is very illuminating on
this point.
There is, of course, the President's Economic Report to Congress
transmitted in January, 1949. The report was largely oriented
about "policies to Combat Inflation...."19 From these policies we
were saved by what has often been considered a major obstacle
to a rational contracyclical program-the considerable time it takes
Congress to act. By January, it is now evident, we were well along
on the 1949 inventory recession, the wholesale price index had been
declining for five successive months (the peak was in August,
1948), and unemployment had been rising after October.
The Federal Reserve, rightly credited with somewhat greater
agility, has had a somewhat similar experience. Their request of
Congress for reimposition of Regulation W (consumer credit con-
trol) and additional powers over member bank reserves was made
in August, 1948, the final month of the price rise. Congress acted
with unusual speed, and the anti-inflation powers were inposed
beginning in September, after the price level had begun its
decline. It must, of course, be said that the Federal Reserve did
reverse itself with reasonably commendable promptness in 1949.
Though it is not usually rated highly by economists, there is
considerable reason to think that the best-timed performance in
discretionary, compensatory fiscal policy was the May, 1948, tax
reduction-nonetheless expertly timed because its proponents were
not known to be devoted to the New Economics. It came just four
months before the beginning of the price decline, and the refunds
19 The Economic Report of the President transmitted to Congress, January,
1949, p, 11.
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were paid out early in 1949 after the recession was getting under-
way.
I do not cite these in an sense as criticisms of institutions or
individuals. In each case there was recourse to eminently qualified
and able experts. Rather these experiences serve to show how
extremely difficult it is to know where you are. But until we can
do better at this, we cannot expect to do very well in prompt and
effective timing of discretionary policy actions.
2. These considerations have turned our attention increasingly
to the concept of built-in stability. The Committee for Economic
Development, among others, has done a great deal to educate us
on this point. The idea is basically quite forthright.av "Set tax
rates to balance the budget and provide a surplus for debt retire-
ment at an agreed high level of employment and national income.
Having set these rates, leave them alone unless there is some
major change in national policy or condition of nationallife."21
a) This has two advantages. It largely avoids the difficult tim-
ing problem. As national income declines, a cash deficit automatic-
ally develops because, with our progressive tax structure, tax
receipts decline rapidly and certain outlays (e. g., unemployment
compensation) automatically rise. Conversely, tax receipts rise
relatively to expenditures on the upswing and the surplus grows as
the need for it grows. The economic process is subject to a sort
of governor that tends to control the speed of operation.
It relies more heavily on sustaining private spending rather
than compensating for its deficiency through added governmental
or collective spending.
b) With the rapid development of social insurance programs
and our currently substantially progressive tax structure, we have
already accomplished a great deal along this line. A correlation
of disposable personal income with gross national product shows
that for the period of 1929-37 (covering the decline and recovery,
but before Social Security had become important), the regression
equation is YcF=2.805+.769 GNP. For 1939-41, on the basis of
seasonally adjusted quarterly data, the equation is Yd=12.392+.629
GNP; and for the five quarters, 1948 third quarter to 1949 third
quarter, YcF=1l8.90+.2868 GNP. These are subject to numerous
20 Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Greater EC(YYI.omic Stability, Committee for
Economic Development, December, 1948, p, 38.
21 "Taxes and the Budget," Committee for Economic Development, 1947.
Quoted in the 1948 report cited above.
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limitations. A considerable dispersion is probably inevitable. The
number of observations is small. The postwar period has been
subject to special influences. It is not always easy to separate
periods in order to distinguish the effects of a changed tax struc-
ture from a change in the tax structure.
Even so, the evidence seems to me to be reasonably clear that
disposable personal income has become less and less sensitive to
changes in the level of general business activity. Each successive
period's coefficient of regression is lower than the preceding one.
For 1929-37 a change of one dollar in gross national product was
associated with a change of 77 cents in disposable personal income;
in 1939-41 it was one dollar to 63 cents; and during the five most
recent quarters for which data are available, it has been one dollar
to 23 cents. (Perhaps here is a substantial part of the reason the
1949 recession was so mild.)
c) There are three major limitations to which this governor-
like arrangement is subject and which deserve mention here.
(1) A recession may be sharp enough that more powerful action
is required. The Committee for Economic Development recognized
that in these circumstances "a temporary reduction of tax rates
may be desirable to stimulate private expenditures."22
(2) Taking less of incomes in taxes undoubtedly encourages
greater private spending, but it does not guarantee it. Even if the
consumption function does not decline, larger deficits may be
required than with public spending since a part of each added
income dollar is usually saved (the marginal propensity to save is
greater than zero).
(3) There is a basic conflict between the concept of built-in
stability and economic progress if the former is pushed too far.
This governor mechanism works most effectively, of course, when
the tax take is extremely sensitive to changes in the level of
national income. This means that a correspondingly substantial
proportion of each added national income dollar must go in taxes.
This also means that the net difference between mediocrity and
doing things better is diminished in a parallel manner. There is
unquestionably considerable room for disagreement as to just how
far we can go along this line before economic progress is jeopard-
ized; there is less room for argument that the problem exists.
3. Has compensatory fiscal policy tended to divert our attention
from very real economic maladjustments in the economy? I think
22 Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Greater Economic Stability, p. 33.
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it has had that result. I do not mean by this to suggest that the
business cycle is primarily a matter of economic disease rather
than "real" factors such as fluctuations in investment incident to
innovations. Nevertheless in any particular situation maladjust-
ments may be a large part of the problem. Let me cite a few illus-
trations of what I mean.
a) The Great Depression was a great depression largely because
of the 1931 to 1933 phase. This, in retrospect, presents itself as
largely a sort of pathological monetary panic. In less than two
years following mid-1931 we lost one-third (7,000) of our banks
and through credit contraction extinguished $15 billion of our
money supply! These are little short of fantastic figures. It would
require no concept ofa chronically weak marginal efficiency of
capital to explain why we went so low--or why for the better
part of a decade thereafter we seemed to be plagued by a condition
of almost absolute liquidity preference. The Great Depression was
a great depression largely because of a specific maladjustment-
the vulnerability of our banking system.
b) One of the particularly disappointing features of the recovery
after 1933 was the continued low level of private construction.
Private construction activity made no significant recovery until
1936, in which year it was 33 per cent of 1929. (The 1936 gross
national product was 79.per cent.) It may have been that we were
in the wrong phase of the eighteen-year construction cycle; there
is some evidence that we were. Nevertheless, in the period from
July, 1936 to September, 1937, a period of general unemployment,
particularly low construction activity, and during which time we
were trying to encourage recovery through public works spending,
construction costs as indicated by the E.N.R. construction cost
index increased 22 per cent, and Boeckh's indexes of residential
construction costs for the four listed cities registered increases
up to 19 per cent.
c) The same questions can be raised about the public housing
assistance currently. Instead of floating the industry off the rocks
with public assistance, it might have been the better part of wise
economic policy first to see why the industry could not operate
more effectively in a period of substantial latent demand and easy
money. Is there labor-management collusion? What about local
monopolies of materials? Building codes? We would probably
have wanted a su.bstantial public housing program in any case.
If so, it could have been just that much more effective if the
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industry itself were placed in a position to give more for the
money.
4. Have we given adequate attention to the significance of the
size of the budget, even if balanced?
The fact that government outlays have increased, or are large,
is not necessarily a cause for alarm. In a very real sense it is a
measure of our development above the jungle economy. We can
now afford certain social programs, always desirable but hereto-
fore out of reach. Moreover, many of these outlays open up or fa-
cilitate private economic development. The automobile industry
could not have attained its present proportions had we been un-
willing to do some of our spending collectively to build a road
system.
A large relative volume of governmental outlays does, however,
pose some problems, and economic statesmanship requires that we
be willing to face them.
a) Beyond a certain point, to the extent that we spend our
incomes collectively through the agency of government the less we
shall have to spend individually. If we have more battleships, we
may have fewer cars. If we have more collection of statistics, we
may have less to collect statistics about.
b) As the relative size of governmental outlays expands, there
results greater upward pressure on the demand side even if the
budget is balanced. For any individual what he gets through
government is not subject to the budgetary or income restraint
that the more he gets the bigger the bill. The rules of the game
encourage pressing for more. What is true for one is true for all.
The price tags tend to be removed, and payment becomes a separate
consideration.
The issue is particularly clearcut if through progressive or
corporate income taxes we can apparently shift the burden to
others-thereby perhaps also helping those who presumably have
too much anyway to squeeze a bit more readily through the needle's
eye. It is imputing no bad motives to people to say that with this
payment constraint removed or diminished, total demand tends
to rise. The advantage of each separate governmental outlay tends
to be concentrated on a particular group, but the cost is diffused
over the whole society. Each separate project thus seems to be
a "good deal." The fact that it adds up to a volume of total out-
lays about which nobody is very happy is not too difficult to under-
46 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE
stand. The result is an upward bias on demand that becomes
progressively more important as collective consumption and income
transfers (governmental outlays) represent a larger proportion
of the economy.
c) How serious this is depends on the collateral effect a large
governmental budget (even if balanced) has on our capacity for
economic growth and progress. We can easily take this matter of
rising productivity too casually-as something that, like old age
and maturity, more or less occurs with the passing of the years.
This is not necessarily the case. Productivity has increased because
ways have been found to make an hour of human endeavor turn
out progressively more and more of the good things of life without
harder work.
While governmental outlays at 23 per cent of our gross national
income are probably not at the peril point, they are large enough
to make a consideration of these issues in order. Particularly is
this so with the current tendency to extrapolate future demands
on the economy on the assumption that our 2 to 3 per cent per
year rise in productivity win continue.
Beyond some point a large budget will begin to inhibit this
process in two distinct ways.
(1) One source of rising productivity is the myriad of ways,
little and big, that are constantly being discovered to cut corners
on costs and improve earnings. And their aggregate effect is the
socially very desirable result of making productive resources go
further. As taxes rise relative to incomes the net difference be-
tween the rewards of those who watch costs and those who do not
is reduced. And one of the results of this is to weaken one of the
economic pressures toward increasing productivity, toward more
effective use of resources.
(2) Moreover the net advantage to the firm which reduces costs
or introduces a new product through an investment program is also
correspondingly reduced relative to the firm which does not so
exert itself. Yet capital formation has been a second major source
of our rising productivity. To the extent that firms must rely on
retained earnings to finance capital outlays, this consideration
becomes particularly important. Then the inducement and the
capacity to invest are both inhibited as taxes bite more and more
deeply into corporate income. Whatever the merits otherwise of
these taxes, one result is apt to be a corresponding stifling of
investment and a reduced rate of economic progress.
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These tendencies are particularly pronounced with the sub-
stantially progressive character of our tax structure,-which para-
doxically is one of the reasons we can rely heavily on built-in
stabilizers. There are certainly sound, impressive reasons of
social justice for a considerable progressivity in our tax structure.
This does, however, have the unfortunate effect of coming down
particularly hard on activities which add to income. Yet those
who are not content to let well enough alone are those whose inno-
vations and activities make a particular contribution to economic
progress. This does not seem to be the proper avenue to rising
productivity. We cannot, in short, dodge this question: How far
can we afford to go in championing those content with things as
they are and penalizing those who try for something better?
We shall, in short, need to take care that the very thing we
count on to enable a continued expansion of social programs does
not become their victim-rising productivity.
V
At the present stage of monetary and fiscal policy the major
questions with which we must come to grips, it seems to me, are
therefore these:
1. How far are we prepared to go toward a reorientation of
monetary policy away from debt management considerations and
toward general economic stability? Can adequate procedures be
devised to facilitate this reorientation?
2. Is there a clear understanding of the implications of the
alternatives?
3. Do we see that the cost of excessively rigid yield rates and
prices of government securities may be devices to force holders
of bonds to hold their bonds, if monetary policy is not to be both
ineffectual itself to restrain a boom and a substantial drag also on
an effective fiscal policy?
4. Can we avoid or minimize certain very real current limita-
tions to the greater use of the governmental receipts-expenditure
process in stabilizing business activity-its tendency to raise prices
and costs before an optimum level of production and employment
is attained; its tendency to divert attention away from specific
maladjustments; the difficulty of timing?
5. Do we need to give more attention to the effect of these and
related policies on our rate of economic expansion and progress?
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This last question is, I think, particularly important. One some-
times has the uncomfortable feeling that we are devoting a con-
siderable proportion of our time to St. Vitus' dance, so to speak,
when an emerging problem of at least equal importance may be
how to avoid economic arthritis.
